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This paper reviews recent progress and indicators of 
trade facilitation in member countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations. The findings show that 
import and export costs vary considerably in the 
member countries, from very low to moderately high 
levels. Tariff and non-tariff barriers are generally low 
to moderate. Infrastructure quality and services sector 
competitiveness range from fair to excellent. Using a 
standard gravity model, the authors find that trade flows 
in Southeast Asia are particularly sensitive to transport 
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infrastructure and information and communications 
technology. The results suggest that the region stands to 
make significant economic gains from trade facilitation 
reform. These gains could be considerably larger than 
those from comparable tariff reforms. Estimates suggest 
that improving port facilities in the region, for example, 
could expand trade by up to 7.5 percent or $22 billion.  
The authors interpret this as an indication of the vital 
role that transport infrastructure can play in enhancing 
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they represent. 1  Introduction 
Two conflicting dynamics in today’s international trading system suggest that trade facilitation is 
particularly important to development prospects. On the one hand, tariffs have been significantly 
cut through a combination of multilateral, regional, and unilateral efforts. Large distortions still 
remain, particularly in agriculture. It is important to recognize, however, the increasingly 
important role of other factors in driving a wedge between export and import prices—and the 
role of trade facilitation policies in reducing that wedge. 
The second dynamic relates to the institutional nature of the trade reform process. Ensuring a 
successful conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda is an important aim for all WTO 
members. The practical reality, however, is that progress at the multilateral level is increasingly 
difficult, in part due to the lack of willingness among some members to engage in substantive 
reform. Countries eager to move forward on trade reform, therefore, seek new alternatives. Trade 
facilitation represents an attractive one. Reform can often be pursued on a regional basis and 
unilaterally, yet usually does not conflict with the principle of non-discrimination. In sum, 
countries moving forward in an open way on trade facilitation can reap the gains from lower 
trade costs, while at the same time allowing the multilateral negotiating process to move forward. 
Indeed, countries that make progress on trade facilitation will be well placed to ensure that they 
benefit to the maximum possible extent from any future multilateral liberalization. 
Trade facilitation is a multi-faceted area. Unlike cutting tariffs or eliminating quotas, progress on 
trade facilitation can involve substantial resource costs related to improving trade-related 
infrastructure, or streamlining customs administrations. Before investing in these measures, it is 
important for policymakers to have an idea of where the priorities are for their countries.  
  - 1 -This paper is intended as first contribution to the research and policy process in ASEAN member 
countries, as it relates to trade facilitation.
1 In the next Section, we provide a brief overview of 
trade facilitation and its potential economic impacts. Then in Section 3, we review recent 
progress on trade facilitation within the region. We emphasize the multi-dimensional nature of 
trade facilitation policies by focusing on four areas where trade transactions costs matter: port 
infrastructure, air transport infrastructure, services sector development, and customs 
administration. In Section 4, we conduct an econometric analysis of trade flows in Southeast 
Asia using the gravity model. This allows us to identify the sensitivity of trade flows to different 
trade facilitation indicators. In order to provide a general idea of the orders of magnitude 
involved in potential policy reforms, we then conduct some counterfactual simulations to show 
the potential gains to Southeast Asia from a feasible but ambitious program of trade facilitation 
reform. We find that those gains are substantial, and in excess of the trade gains from tariff cuts 
of similar ambition. Section 5 presents conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
2  Trade Facilitation: What are the Stakes? 
At its most general, “trade facilitation” refers to the set of policies that reduce the costs of 
importing and exporting. In defining the term in this way, we are consciously taking a broad 
approach to the type of policy measures that it includes (cf. Wilson et al., 2005). On the one 
hand, we include customs formalities, administrative procedures, and regulatory transparency 
directly linked to the trading process. This is essentially what is covered by the current WTO 
negotiations on trade facilitation. However, we also include a broader range of measures such as 
                                                 
1 ASEAN has ten member countries: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
  - 2 -infrastructure, institutional transparency and good governance, and domestic regulations (cf. 
Wilson, 2005). All of these factors can impact trade performance through the cost channel.
2 
Estimates in the existing literature suggest that the gains from trade facilitation are large. Wilson 
et al. (2005) use econometric estimates from a gravity model to show that improved trade 
facilitation in a sample of 75 countries could increase trade by 10%, or $377bn. For the Asia-
Pacific region, Wilson et al. (2002) estimate that improving trade facilitation along four 
dimensions could increase intra-APEC trade by around 10% ($280bn). Using the GTAP 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, Hertel and Keeney (2006) find that the worldwide 
gains from improved trade facilitation ($110bn) are of comparable magnitude to the results of 
full liberalization of goods and services trade ($150bn).
3 Moreover, the authors’ results indicate 
that the benefits of trade facilitation reforms are strongly skewed towards developing countries—
particularly in Asia.
4 
It is important to note that the above studies treat trade facilitation measures as affecting only the 
marginal costs of trading across borders. However, there are many instances in which exporters 
will also have to pay a fixed cost in order to access foreign markets. Examples include making 
contact with shippers and freight handlers, establishing the necessary pro forma paperwork, 
setting up a foreign distribution network, and adapting manufactured goods to comply with 
foreign technical regulations. To the extent that trade facilitation measures can reduce both 
                                                 
2 Recent work has shown that both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure (i.e., institutions) matter for trade performance: 
see Francois and Manchin (2007).  
3 These figures do not account for the costs involved in carrying out trade facilitation reforms. Those costs are 
substantial, and do not apply in the same way to trade policy reforms—which are essentially “free” in terms of direct 
resource requirements. However, recent work on road infrastructure by Shepherd and Wilson (2006), and Buys et al. 
(2006) shows that trade gains can still be quantitatively large even once costs are netted out. 
4 A number of other CGE studies arrive at similar results using alternative assumptions as to underlying economic 
behavior: see e.g., Walkenhorst and Yasui (2003), Francois et al. (2005), and Decreux and Fontagné (2006). 
  - 3 -marginal and fixed costs, then recent trade theories suggest additional channels through which 
countries can gain.
5  
We start from the well established empirical regularity that only a small minority of firms in each 
country actually export, and that those which do export tend to be larger and more productive 
than those which do not.
6 One powerful explanation for this phenomenon is self-selection: only 
high productivity firms (with low marginal production costs) are able to make a profit whilst 
meeting the additional costs associated with exporting. Low productivity (high cost) firms cannot 
do so. These companies produce for the domestic market only and are not directly influenced by 
the costs of exporting. 
Within this framework, falling trade costs have a number of other effects on firms and the 
national economy. First, as the costs of exporting fall, it is more likely that there is at least one 
firm with high enough productivity to successfully export. Export propensity should therefore 
increase as trade costs fall. Second, less productive firms at the fringes of the export market will 
find that it becomes profitable to start exporting. Lower export costs can therefore facilitate entry 
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) into export markets, thereby expanding the number of 
people and firms that are in direct contact with the world market. Third, lower trade costs tend to 
promote the reallocation of resources from low-productivity to high-productivity firms. The 
overall effect will be to increase the economy’s level of productivity, which may have important 
implications for future growth prospects. 
                                                 
5 We have in mind the heterogeneous firms framework of Melitz (2003) or Chaney (2006). 
6 See Bernard et al. (2007) for a recent consolidation of this literature. 
  - 4 -Summarizing the above, we would argue that Southeast Asia stands to reap significant potential 
gains from improved trade facilitation.  This can be achieved both through increased trade flows 
and entry into new export markets and higher productivity. The measures included in any reform 
program will necessarily cut across a number of policy areas that are relevant to the specific 
costs facing exporters. These will include infrastructure, customs services, regulatory reform, 
efficiency of trade-related services, and governance. Policymakers and stakeholders therefore 
need to prioritize reforms: they are often costly and difficult to implement, and therefore they 
cannot all be tackled simultaneously or to the same extent. The remainder of this paper aims to 
provide some first indications as to what the priorities might be in Southeast Asia.  
3  Moving Goods across Borders in Southeast Asia 
This Section provides a “snapshot” of the costs of exporting and importing in Southeast Asia. It 
then examines recent progress towards trade facilitation goals, by comparing scores on key 
indicators over the period 2000-2005. We follow the approach of Wilson et al. (2005) and adapt 
it, where needed, due to non-availability of certain data. 
3.1  A “Snapshot” of Trade Costs in ASEAN 
We now address in detail the state of trade costs in ASEAN as of 2006 (or most recent data). 
Data from the World Bank’s Doing Business database show that the overall cost of importing in 
ASEAN is relatively low by world standards (Figure 1). For the first time in 2006, the “Trading 
Across Borders” component of Doing Business captured the total official cost for importing or 
exporting a standardized cargo of goods, excluding ocean transit and trade policy measures such 
as tariffs. The four main components of the costs that are captured are: costs related to the 
preparation of documents required for trading, such as a letter of credit, bill of lading, etc.; costs 
  - 5 -related to the transportation of goods to the relevant sea port; administrative costs related to 
customs clearance, technical controls, and inspections; and ports and terminal handling charges. 
The indicator thus provides a useful cross-section of information in relation to a country's 
approach to trade facilitation, in the broad sense in which that term is used by Wilson et al. 
(2005). The data are collected from local freight forwarders, shipping lines, customs brokers, and 
port officials, based on a standard set of assumptions, including: the traded cargo travels in a 20ft 
full container load; the cargo is valued at $20,000; and the goods do not require any special 
phytosanitary, environmental, or safety standards beyond what is required internationally. 
The average import cost across those ASEAN Members for which data are available is around 
$900 per container. This figure is slightly below the overall regional average for East Asia and 
the Pacific, of $1037 per container, and is only a little higher than the OECD average ($883). 
However, the average masks large variation in import costs across countries: costs in Singapore 
run at $333 per container—the lowest in the world—while in Laos they are over five times 
higher ($1690). 
In all but two countries, Laos and the Philippines, the cost of importing is lower than the Upper 
Middle Income group average.
7 Within ASEAN, we can identify three groups of countries. The 
first—Singapore and Malaysia—are very strong performers in terms of import costs, at under 
$500 per container. The second group—Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam—still 
perform well, broadly in the region of the OECD average. The third group—Laos and the 
Philippines—do markedly less well. 
                                                 
7 Among ASEAN countries, there are two high-income countries (Brunei Darussalam, and Singapore), one upper-
middle income country (Malaysia), three lower-middle income countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand), 
and four low income countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). 
  - 6 -A basically similar picture emerges in relation to the cost of exporting, again sourced from Doing 
Business (Figure 2). On average, ASEAN does relatively well: $806 per container is slightly 
lower than the OECD average of $811. However, the range within the region is very wide, from 
Singapore—which at $382 per container is amongst the top 5 in the world—to Laos at $1420 per 
container, nearly four times higher than Singapore. 
Interestingly, although the cost figures for importing and exporting are generally low even 
compared with the OECD, the same is not as true for time and document counts (Figures 3-4).
8 
Both at export and import, the number of documents required and time taken in ASEAN 
countries are well in excess of the OECD average: 32 days versus 12 days for importing, and 11 
documents versus 6. However, Singapore is once again one of the world leaders in relation to 
trade times, reinforcing the image of intra-regional heterogeneity that has already been given. 
To round out our snapshot, we use results from Kee et al. (2006) to provide an overall 
assessment of the trade policy environment in ASEAN (excepting Cambodia, Myanmar, and 
Singapore, which are not included in the Kee et al. (2006) study). Those authors calculate two 
measures that are of interest. A country’s Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) is the 
uniform tariff which, if applied, would give the same level of imports into that country as under 
current policy settings. Its Market Access OTRI (MA-OTRI) is the uniform tariff which, if 
applied by the rest of the world, would give the same level of exports out of that country as under 
current policy settings. 
Table 4 provides OTRI and MA-OTRI measures for ASEAN member countries, in versions that 
include tariffs only, and both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. We also differentiate between total 
                                                 
8 These data are also sourced from the World Bank’s Doing Business database, and are constructed analogously to 
the cost data. 
  - 7 -trade, agriculture, and manufactures. On average across all products, ASEAN countries are 
slightly more open than the world average if only tariffs are considered (9% versus 11%), but are 
less open when NTBs are considered as well (22% versus 18%). This result highlights the 
importance of non-tariff barriers in the ASEAN context. We find that, as in most other regions, 
ASEAN countries tend to protect agriculture more strongly than manufactures (46% versus 19% 
when both tariffs and non-tariff barriers are included). 
Regional averages tend to obscure considerable cross-country heterogeneity, however. In terms 
of tariffs, for instance, three ASEAN countries are well below the world average OTRI: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. (Singapore can also be included in this group, since it 
has a zero applied tariff on almost all goods; it is not included in the Kee et al. (2006) sample.) 
Laos and Brunei are at approximately the world average, while Thailand and Vietnam would 
appear to have higher tariff protection than the world average. This grouping is very different, 
however, once NTBs are accounted for. We find that Brunei, Indonesia, and Thailand have lower 
than (world) average protection, while all other ASEAN countries for which we have data are 
significantly more restricted than the world average. 
We retain two main points from the above “snapshot” of the trade policy and facilitation 
environment in ASEAN. First, traditional trade policy (such as tariffs) varies considerably across 
the region, even though on average ASEAN is slightly more open that the world as a whole. 
Similar variation is also apparent in terms of the role of NTBs, with ASEAN being slightly less 
open than the world average. Second, the direct costs of exporting and importing are generally 
quite low compared with other regions, even though there is once again considerable 
heterogeneity across countries. Despite this, the number of documentary formalities for 
exporting and importing—as well as the time taken for these transactions—is less impressive. 
  - 8 -3.2  Evolution of Trade Facilitation Measures in Southeast Asia, 2000-2005 
It is also important to analyze the trade facilitation environment in the context of recent reform 
efforts. As in Wilson et al. (2005), we source our trade facilitation indicators from the annual 
Global Competitiveness Report issued by the World Economic Forum. Based on a large 
survey—over 11,000 business leaders in 125 countries—the CGR presents perception indices 
covering various aspects of infrastructure quality, trade policy, governance, and regulatory 
reform. Scores are calculated based on responses to survey questions in which executives are 
asked to indicate their opinion on a scale of 1 (bad) to 7 (good). The survey nature of these data 
means that we should be cautious in interpreting changes from one year to the next: small 
differences may well reflect sampling error rather than genuine substantive differences.  
In light of changes in the survey questions over time, as well as data availability for ASEAN 
member countries, we choose to assess regional progress on trade facilitation through the lens of 
four indicators. Our approach is broadly similar to that of Wilson et al. (2005). To capture 
physical infrastructure, we examine the quality of maritime port infrastructure and air transport 
infrastructure. As an indicator of customs administration, we use the extent of irregular payments 
connected with import and export permits. And we use the quality of competition in the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) sector as a proxy for services sector infrastructure.
9 
In the case of our two transport infrastructure indicators (Figures 7-8), it is difficult to see any 
clear trend over time. Singapore is consistently ranked very highly for its port infrastructure, 
while Malaysia and Thailand appear to have improved slightly over time. The remaining 
countries for which we have data have remained approximately stable, with the possible 
                                                 
9 The first three indicators are also used by Wilson et al. (2005). However, the Wilson et al. (2005) indicator for 
service sector infrastructure does not appear in later GCRs, so we are forced to use an alternative measure. 
  - 9 -exception of Indonesia, which discloses a worsening trend. That pattern is approximately the 
same for air transport infrastructure, although the movements involved are even less clear than in 
the case of ports. 
In terms of the extent of irregular payments for import/export licenses (Figure 9), we observe 
that Malaysia and Thailand would appear to have improved slightly over the sample period. 
Other countries have remained much the same, with the possible exception of Indonesia—it 
seems, once again, to be on a downwards trend. As was the case for infrastructure, Singapore is 
well ahead of the other ASEAN member countries on this criterion. 
Interestingly, the quality of competition in the internet services sector (Figure 10) discloses more 
homogeneous performance than was the case for the other indicators. At the end of the sample 
period, all ASEAN member countries except Vietnam are clustered at around 5 on the 1-7 scale. 
This represents a slight improvement over the sample period in most cases. Strangely, Singapore 
would appear to have regressed slightly since the beginning of the sample. We do not, however, 
put too much weight on this, since its performance is relatively stable through time if the first 
observation (2000) is disregarded. 
3.3  Consolidation: Where Does Southeast Asia Stand? 
It is difficult on the basis of these data to highlight any strong trends in trade facilitation in 
Southeast Asia. While Malaysia and Thailand appear to have improved in recent years on some 
dimensions, the rest of the region has remained approximately stable. The most important 
stylized fact is therefore cross-country heterogeneity, which appears to be persistent over time. 
This heterogeneity is reflective both of income differences across countries, and explicit policy 
choices (such as free trade in Singapore). The presence of strong performers such as Singapore 
and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia and Thailand, shows that significant progress is possible for the 
  - 10 -remaining ASEAN member countries. Indeed, data from Doing Business suggest that even 
Malaysia and Thailand have room for further streamlining and simplification of customs 
procedures. 
One caveat in relation to these conclusions relates to data availability. Tables 1-3 summarize the 
extent of the available information for the period 2000-2005 across ASEAN member countries. 
Our dataset is most complete for trade data (export and import flows). Table 1 shows that data 
are missing over all years only for Laos and Myanmar. Although Vietnam, Brunei, and 
Cambodia are each missing one or two years of information, the dataset is reasonably complete 
as regards other ASEAN member countries. In relation to applied tariffs, Table 1 indicates that 
data are available for all ASEAN member countries, albeit with some missing observations for 
around half of them. 
The picture is generally less detailed in relation to our other indicators. While Doing Business 
indicators on the cost and time of exporting and importing have good country coverage—all 
except Brunei and Myanmar—they are only available for two years (time) or one year (cost). 
However, data from the Global Competitiveness Report are not available at all for Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, or Myanmar. 
This short review of the available data highlights two issues that will need greater attention in 
future work. First, lack of data across these basic indicators means that there are a number of 
ASEAN countries—Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar—for which it will be very difficult 
to perform individualized analysis and to tailor policy measures to their particular situations. For 
the moment, we will essentially be extrapolating from other countries’ experiences, which is not 
entirely satisfactory. Second, we have only addressed one subset of the possible indicators that 
might be of interest in a trade facilitation setting. Other indicators, such as the pervasiveness of 
  - 11 -non-tariff measures or the compliance costs related to non-harmonized product standards, are 
notoriously difficult to compile, even for high income OECD countries. But as tariff rates 
continue to fall in ASEAN as elsewhere, it will become increasingly important to invest 
resources in assembling these data.  
4  What Does Southeast Asia Stand to Gain? 
In this Section, we use a standard modeling framework to provide an indication of the possible 
trade gains for Southeast Asia in pursuing additional trade facilitation reforms. To do so, we will 
apply the gravity model. According to Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p.1384), it has produced 
“some of the clearest and most robust empirical findings in economics”. In sum, the model 
suggests that trade between two countries is a function of their economic “mass” (usually GDP), 
and observable factors that impact trade costs between them. The observable factors included in 
gravity models usually cover distance (to capture the effect of transport costs), geographical and 
historical connections (such as colonization or a common language), and trade policy factors 
(such as tariffs). 
By applying the gravity model to trade data for Southeast Asia, we can obtain statistical 
estimates of the sensitivity of bilateral trade flows to changes in various trade facilitation 
indicators.
10 To do this, we build on the approach of Wilson et al. (2005). The indicators that we 
consider here cover the following dimensions of trade facilitation: efficiency of maritime and air 
ports, the extent of irregular payments in relation to export/import licenses, and the level of 
competition amongst internet service providers (a proxy for regulation of backbone services 
                                                 
10 Although the focus of this paper is on ASEAN member countries, we estimate the model using data for all 
Southeast Asian countries for which we have information. This is to compensate for the lack of data on a number of 
ASEAN countries, as noted above. 
  - 12 -sectors).
11 Data on these variables are sourced from the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report. We also control for the presence of tariffs (sourced from WITS-Trains), 
in addition to standard geographical and historical factors (Mayer and Zignago, 2006). Our trade 
data come from WITS-Comtrade, and are disaggregated by BEC 1-digit sector.
12 We estimate 
the model over the period 2000-2005. (See Tables 5-6 for a description of our data, sources, and 
sample.) 
4.1  Model Specification 
Initially used because of its explanatory power in empirical settings, the gravity model is now 
known to be consistent with a rigorous theoretical derivation. In this paper, we use the micro-
founded gravity model of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003, 2004). It is now the standard 
approach taken in the trade literature. 
From basic microeconomic principles, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003, 2004) show that it is 
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t k σ  = Elasticity of substitution in 
                                                 
11 For technical reasons, we have to take the average of our trade facilitation indicators across the importing and 
exporting countries. This is because importer- and exporter-specific measures, although time varying, are very 
strongly correlated with the time-invariant fixed effects we use to take account of market size and relative price 
effects. Estimation using separate measures of exporter and importer infrastructure does not produce meaningful 
results because of the strength of this correlation. 
12 This is a very broad product classification, and is intended to give a first indication of potential cross-sectoral 
differences in the impact of trade facilitation measures. 
  - 13 -sector k;   = Trade costs facing exports from country i to country j in sector k for year t;   = 
Country i’s output share in sector k for year t;   = Country j’s expenditure share in sector k for 
year t; and   = Random error term, satisfying the usual assumptions. Inward resistance 
 captures the fact that j’s imports from i depend on trade costs 
across all suppliers. Outward resistance  , by contrast, captures the 
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Before we can implement this model in an empirical setting, we need to specify bilateral trade 
costs   in terms of observable variables. As is common in this literature, we postulate that trade 
costs are a function of distance (a proxy for transport costs), geographical and historical factors, 















We define distijt as the distance between the two countries, proxied by the great circle distance 
between their respective capital cities. The power of the importer’s applied tariff is ( )
k
ijt τ + 1 . The 
quality of sea and air ports are captured by seaijt and airijt respectively, while irregijt is the extent 
of irregular payments in trade transactions, and isp_compijt is the level of competition among 
ISPs. The remaining trade cost observables are binary dummy variables. Contigij is equal to one 
only if two countries share a common border. The role of historical factors is proxied by comcolij 
and smctryij, which are respectively equal to one only if two countries were colonized by the 
  - 14 -same power or were once part of the same country. Finally, comlang_offij equals one only if two 
countries have at least one official language in common.  
Before combining (1) and (2) to give a standard empirical gravity model, we adopt the common 
simplification of using fixed effects to account for output, expenditure, and resistance terms, 
rather than seeking to estimate them directly (cf. Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). A strict 
derivation from (1) suggests that fixed effects are required in the importer-sector-time, exporter-
sector-time, and sector-time dimensions (cf. Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). To take account of the 
possibility of cross-sectoral variation in the elasticity of substitution, the parameters in the trade 
cost function should also be allowed to vary by sector. However, it is often impractical to 
estimate such a large number of parameters. This is a particular concern in the present case, since 
our effective sample is relatively small by gravity standards (just under 1,500 observations). We 
therefore propose using time- and sector-invariant fixed effects by importer and exporter (μi and 
χj), in addition to fixed effects in the sector and time dimensions (ψk and θt). Experience suggests 
that this often represents an acceptable compromise between theoretical consistency and 
empirical tractability.
13 
Our baseline empirical specification therefore takes the following form: 
() ( ) ( )
k
ijt ij ij ij ij ijt ijt
ijt ijt
k
ijt ij t k j i
k
ijt
smctry off comlang comcol contig comp isp irreg
air sea dist imports
ε β β β β β β
β β τ β β θ ψ χ μ
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + =
10 9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
_ ) _ log( ) log( ...
... ) log( ) log( 1 log log log
(3) 
                                                 
13 As a robustness check, we also estimated models using the complete fixed effects specification suggested by 
theory. Results were qualitatively similar to those reported here, but estimates were often imprecise due to the 
elimination of most of the variation in the data due to the inclusion of such a large number of fixed effects. A 
number of point estimates also had implausible magnitudes. These factors led us to prefer the simplified model used 
here. 
  - 15 -We estimate (3) using ordinary least squares (OLS), as implemented in Stata SE 9.2. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by country pair. It is not possible in this 
case to use alternative econometric methods such as Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) or Heckman sample selection (Helpman et al., 2007). Such 
methods address the presence of bilateral trade flows that are zero or missing from the dataset. 
However, they require that the independent variables be observed for those flows. In our dataset, 
it is in fact the extent of data availability for the independent variables that is the binding 
constraint for our estimation sample, not the presence of zero trade flows.  
4.2  Results 
Estimation results for our preferred specification are reported in Table 7 column 1. Broadly 
speaking, we find that the model performs well. From its R
2 statistic, we can see that it accounts 
for around 64% of observed variation in bilateral trade within our sample. All estimated 
parameters have the expected signs: distance and tariffs impact bilateral trade negatively, while 
improvements in trade facilitation or closer historico-cultural ties have a positive impact. With 
the possible exception of air transport infrastructure, their magnitudes are sensible and broadly 
similar to the results of Wilson et al. (2005).
14  
However, some estimated coefficients are not statistically significant at the standard 10% level. 
This is the case for applied tariffs, the quality of maritime ports, and the extent of irregular 
payments in import/export transactions, as well as the common colonizer and same country 
dummy variables. We expect this to be due to the relatively small (by gravity model standards) 
dataset we are using in this case, and the resulting correlations amongst the explanatory 
                                                 
14 While it is impossible to make a formal comparison between our Table 7 and Table 2 in Wilson et al. (2005) due 
to the different modeling approaches adopted, the two sets of coefficients are generally quite similar.  
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coefficient estimates than these ones. We continue with them on the basis that they represent the 
current best state of knowledge in this area, but which will of course be refined in the future. 
Despite their relative lack of precision in some cases, the estimated coefficients in Table 7 
column 1 provide us with some useful information as to the determinants of trade flows in 
Southeast Asia. First, we see that distance is relatively less important than is commonly found in 
the gravity model literature: a 1% increase in bilateral distance decreases trade by only 0.4%, 
rather than the more common 1%. Interestingly, trade in Southeast Asia appears to be 
particularly sensitive to the quality of air transport infrastructure and the level of competition in 
the internet services sector: a 1% improvement in the former boosts trade by nearly 5%, while a 
similar change in the latter leads to a trade increase of just over 1%.
15 This is suggestive of the 
emergence of electronic trade and business in the region, as well as an increasing shift towards 
relatively high value merchandise (which can profitably be transported by air).
16 These 
observations might be consistent with the growing importance of transnational production 
networks in Southeast Asia (Ng and Yeats, 1999), since these organizations need to exchange 
goods rapidly and reliably, and they tend to be intensive users of communications and 
information technology. However, our data do not yet allow us to address that issue in detail. 
                                                 
15 It would, however, be premature to put too much weight on air transport in policy terms. This is because measures 
of air and maritime infrastructure are strongly correlated, which makes it difficult to distinguish between their 
independent effects on trade. It may be that what this very large coefficient is in fact capturing is partly related to the 
general quality of transport infrastructure in the region. This is a point that will need development in future work, 
based on the collection of more detailed data. 
16 An alternative explanation of our results could be that maritime transport is based on hub-and-spokes 
arrangements, in which it is not just the importing and exporting ports that matter in determining costs and delays. 
This is an interesting issue for future research, but without detailed data on shipping routes, we cannot fully address 
it at this stage. 
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In this Section, we briefly present results of alternatives to our preferred gravity model 
specification (Table 7 column 1). The results presented address two issues. First, we provide 
further detail on the relative importance of maritime versus air transport. Second, we address the 
issue of cross-sectoral heterogeneity as it might affect our regression results. 
4.3.1  Transport Infrastructure: Sea versus Air Ports 
As already noted, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on air transport in Table 7 appears 
to us to be too large. One possible driving force for this unexpectedly high estimate is that 
infrastructure quality is correlated across the air and maritime sectors. Thus, the coefficient on air 
transport could in fact be picking up broader infrastructure quality effects not directly related to 
airports themselves. To demonstrate this point, columns 2-3 of Table 7 set out regression results 
for a model with the same form as in column 1, but with the two infrastructure quality variables 
included separately. The Table shows that both coefficients are higher when only one 
infrastructure variable is included. The effect is stronger (in relative terms) for maritime transport 
than for air transport: the coefficient is around four times larger. We interpret these results as 
being consistent with the argument that the estimated coefficients in Table 7 column 1—and the 
simulations conducted using them (see below)—probably overstate the importance of air 
transport infrastructure as such. 
4.3.2  Cross-Sectoral Heterogeneity 
The gravity model regressions in Table 7 use data for six BEC 1-digit product categories. They 
distinguish among them using fixed effects. However, it is possible that different product groups 
react differently to improved trade facilitation, and that such heterogeneity expresses itself in a 
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elasticities might vary from one sector to another. To address this issue, Table 8 presents results 
from gravity models in the same form as Table 7 column 1, but estimated separately for each 
product category and for total (aggregate) bilateral trade. 
It is immediately apparent from Table 8 that estimating separate gravity models by sector greatly 
reduces the number of observations that we have to work with. When estimated by fixed effects, 
we find (not unexpectedly) that the model estimates often lack precision as compared with their 
counterparts in Table 7. We therefore interpret the results in Table 8 as only an approximate 
guide to the types of cross-sectoral heterogeneity that might be present in these data. 
With this caveat in mind, the results in Table 8 disclose some evidence of cross-sectoral 
heterogeneity. The distance elasticity, for instance, is much larger in absolute value for food and 
capital goods than for fuels, which stands to reason. In terms of our trade facilitation indicators, 
we find that the fuel sector is highly sensitive to the quality of maritime port infrastructure, but 
that there is not a statistically significant relationship for any other sector. Given that fuels are 
unlikely to be transported by air, this relationship makes sense—although the lack of significance 
(and perversity of sign) for other sectors is surprising. Air transport infrastructure, on the other 
hand, is statistically significant for all sectors except food and fuels. This result reinforces the 
conclusion above to the effect that air transport plays an important role in ASEAN trade, 
although the magnitude of these coefficients is still relatively high, perhaps due to the indicator 
picking up measures of infrastructure quality more broadly. The two remaining indicators, 
irregular payments and ISP competition, are only statistically significant for industrial supplies 
and (in the latter case only) consumer goods. In the case of industrial supplies, these results could 
be consistent with an expanding role for transnational production networks in Southeast Asia, 
  - 19 -indicating that they need to be able to communicate reliably amongst their various offices, and 
that they are sensitive to the cost/price uncertainty that extensive irregular payments can imply. 
While these results are suggestive, we stress that our relatively small samples render our 
estimates imprecise, and we do not therefore use Table 8 to draw any strong policy conclusions 
at this stage.  
4.4  Counterfactual Simulations 
In order to give our analysis more concrete policy content, it is useful to construct basic 
monetary estimates of the trade gains that could be associated with improved trade facilitation in 
Southeast Asia. We follow the approach in Wilson et al. (2005), in which the estimated 
coefficients from the gravity model are used as the basis for counterfactual simulations which 
can then be analyzed comparatively. We emphasize that this approach is only designed to give a 
broad idea of the relative impacts of different policy reforms, and is subject to numerous 
technical caveats (see below). 
Our analysis includes five counterfactual scenarios. In Scenario 1, the quality of maritime port 
infrastructure as measured by our Global Competitiveness Report data is improved so that no 
country scores below the current regional average (4.6 out of 7). Scenario 2 performs the same 
exercise for airport infrastructure (regional average = 5.1/7), while Scenarios 3 and 4 consider 
improvements in the control of irregular payments and competition among internet service 
providers (regional averages of 4.6/7 and 4.9/7 respectively). As a point of comparison for the 
other counterfactuals, Scenario 5 considers a cut in applied tariffs to the current regional average 
(8.6%). Our reason for choosing the current regional average as our benchmark in each case is 
that it represents an ambitious but feasible program of reform, given current regional capacities. 
  - 20 -It is a more pertinent benchmark than, say, the average amongst high income countries, or OECD 
members. 
We conduct the counterfactual simulations as follows. We take 2005 as our base year. We then 
recalculate (for example) our maritime infrastructure indicator with the condition that those 
countries under the regional average for 2005 have their score increased to that value. This 
allows us to calculate the percentage change in the indicator for each country pair, which we map 
to an approximate trade impact using the gravity model elasticities. 
Results for our five simulations are presented in Tables 9-13, and are compared in Table 14. In 
line with the results cited at the beginning of this paper, we find that the expected intraregional 
trade gains from improved trade facilitation are very substantial, and would appear to be greater 
than the gains from tariff reductions of comparable ambition. Cutting applied tariffs to the 
regional average would increase intraregional trade by about 2% ($6.3bn). Improving port 
facilities, limiting unofficial payments, and improving competitiveness in the internet services 
sector would boost trade by 7.5% ($22bn), 2.3% ($6.8bn), and 5.7% ($17bn) respectively. 
According to our results, improving air transport could increase trade by a very substantial 
margin: 42% or nearly $125bn. However, we consider this estimate likely high for the reasons 
set out earlier. As noted, air transport infrastructure quality is strongly correlated with the quality 
of other types of infrastructure, including maritime ports. We therefore interpret this result as an 
indication of the vital role that transport infrastructure can play in enhancing intra-regional trade. 
In terms of policy priorities, our results suggest the following ranking based on estimated trade 
flow impacts. First, transport infrastructure is clearly a major issue for Southeast Asia to address 
in ongoing and future reform programs (see Scenarios 1 and 2). Trade flows appear to be very 
sensitive to transport infrastructure quality. ASEAN member countries may therefore find it 
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this, we are conscious that infrastructure upgrading can involve significant costs. Whereas we 
emphasize the relative benefits of different options in this paper, informed policymaking would 
of course need to be based on a rigorous cost-benefit assessment in each case. 
Second, e-business and connectivity would also seem to be very important for the region (see 
Scenario 4). ASEAN member countries may therefore also benefit from giving priority to 
improvement of information technology infrastructure and, more generally, the competitiveness 
of backbone services sectors. Such an agenda could include both domestic regulatory reforms, 
and increased openness to international services trade in these sectors under the GATS. 
Finally, there is still progress to be made in reducing “traditional” trade barriers (such as tariffs), 
and in improving governance and transparency in such a way as to limit the role of unofficial 
payments in import/export transactions. While significant economic benefits could flow from 
these steps, the data indicate at this stage that it may be preferable from a trade flow point of 
view to concentrate most heavily on the other two areas in the short-term. These conclusions are 
broadly consistent with the data presented earlier indicating that tariff protection in Southeast 
Asia is generally at a low to moderate level. However, those same data—based on the Kee et al. 
(2006) OTRI—suggest that non-tariff barriers may play a significantly more important role. Due 
to lack of information at this point, we have not explicitly considered the role of non-tariff 
barriers in our gravity model. This would be an important point for future research to elaborate 
on, so as to give reform of these measures an appropriate place in the policy ranking we are 
suggesting. 
Before concluding this Section, it is important to stress that our results, like all simulation results, 
are subject to a number of caveats. First, our results in relation to tariffs, maritime port 
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estimates in Table 7 column 1—on which the simulations are based—are not statistically 
significant. They should therefore be treated as approximate indications of relative impacts only. 
Second, our impact estimates are expressed as trade effects, not economic welfare as such. Third, 
our results apply only to intra-regional trade, and do not take account of possible extra-regional 
effects. Were the policy reforms contemplated in each scenario to be implemented in a non-
discriminatory manner, there would be considerable scope to produce gains for economies 
outside the region as well. Our results in that case would be a lower bound for the likely range of 
overall (worldwide) effects. Fourth, our simulations implicitly assume that the elasticities on 
which they are based remain constant before and after the policy shock. While this may be the 
case for small policy changes, it is unlikely to hold for major regime shifts. Finally, none of the 
scenarios take account of the existence of quantitative restrictions that may represent binding 
constraints on bilateral trade even following reforms. This is due to limited availability of 
detailed data on such measures, and is a feature that we would hope future work could address in 
greater detail. In particular, we would hope that analysis using a computable general equilibrium 
model could complement the results we have presented here. 
5  Conclusions and Future Research 
As the results presented in this paper make clear, ASEAN member countries have much to gain 
from improved trade facilitation. While a comprehensive reform program would need to cover 
areas as diverse as infrastructure, services sector regulation, “traditional” trade policy, and 
customs administration, our results suggest that ASEAN has a particular interest in focusing on 
just two of those areas in the first instance: transport infrastructure, and information technology. 
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helping policymakers and stakeholders arrive at a tentative prioritization of their efforts in this 
area. In the future, more detailed analysis is required in relation to particular reform programs, 
covering both benefits and costs. This will require collection of new datasets covering all 
ASEAN member countries. As noted at the outset, the sources we have used here—Doing 
Business, the Global Competitiveness Yearbook, and WITS—are sometimes missing data for 
ASEAN. It would be desirable to correct this in the future. More generally, consistent and 
reliable data on non-tariff barriers are currently scarce. Given trade facilitation’s ability to act on 
such barriers, it will be increasingly important in the future to ensure that data collection in this 
area is adequately and sustainably resourced. 
Another way in which policy-relevant research can add value is by complementing existing data 
with information on the ways in which trade facilitation reforms impact different sections of the 
supply chain, given particular industry and firm characteristics. One starting point for this line of 
policy research might be the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (e.g., Hausman et al., 
2005). Alternatively, one could imagine expanding the Doing Business data on “trading across 
borders” in order to assemble more detailed data on these questions. Such data would be an 
important input into the policymaking process, since they would help stakeholders target 
reforms—and resources—where they are most needed in particular countries. 
In addition, our results have only addressed the static impacts of trade facilitation reform. We do 
not assess the possible effects on productivity, growth, or economic development as such. 
However, as we have discussed in this paper, there are good reasons to believe that better trade 
facilitation can impact each of these positively. Although the net balance of costs and benefits 
cannot yet be stated with certainty—since we have not estimated the costs of improving trade 
  - 24 -facilitation in ways consistent with our simulations—we expect that it will be positive even once 
these costs are netted out. However, that assessment can only be made within the framework of 
specific project appraisals, and will need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
This paper has analyzed the impacts of trade facilitation reform at the aggregate level. We 
expect, however, that trade facilitation may have larger effects on certain types of trade, such as 
parts and components that are used by transnational production networks. This is because such 
networks are based on the idea of efficient cross-border sourcing of selected inputs, and this is an 
area where trade facilitation reforms can impact directly. The importance of these networks in 
Southeast Asia could be one factor explaining the strong results we have found in relation to 
transport infrastructure and information and communications technology. Future policy research 
will, we hope, provide more quantitative detail on these issues, and explore the ways in which 
policymakers can use trade facilitation reforms to help achieve greater international integration. 
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Table 1: Availability of trade and trade policy data for ASEAN member countries. 
Country  Exports  Imports  Applied tariffs  Hidden trade 
barriers 


















2001-2003 NA  NA 
Laos  NA NA 2000-2001;  2004  NA  NA 



























2001-2004 2000-2004 2005-2006 
Sources: WITS (columns 1-3), and the Global Competitiveness Report (columns 4-5). 
 
Table 2: Availability of trade facilitation data for ASEAN member countries. 














NA NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Indonesia  2005-2006 2006  2000-
2006 
2001 2000-2004  2001-
2006 
Cambodia  2005-2006 2006  NA  NA  2000-2004  NA 
Laos  2005-2006 2006  NA  NA  2000-2004  NA 
Myanmar  NA NA  NA  NA  2000-2004  NA 
Malaysia  2005-2006 2006  2000-
2006 
2001 2000-2004  2001-
2006 
Philippines  2005-2006 2006  2000-
2006 
2001 2000-2004  2001-
2006 
Singapore  2005-2006 2006  2000-
2006 
2001 2000-2004  2001-
2006 
Thailand  2005-2006 2006  2000-
2006 
2001 2000-2004  2001-
2006 
Vietnam  2005-2006 2006  2000-
2006 
2001 2000-2004  2001-
2006 
Sources: Doing Business (columns 1-2), Global Competitiveness Report (columns 3, 4, and 6), and WDI (column 5). 
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NA 2000;  2002-2005  NA  NA 
Indonesia  2000-2006 2000;  2002-2005  2006  2000-2006 
Cambodia  NA 2000;  2002-2005  NA  NA 
Laos  NA 2000;  2002-2005  NA  NA 
Myanmar  NA 2000;  2002-2005  NA  NA 
Malaysia  2000-2006 2000;  2002-2005  2006  2000-2006 
Philippines  2000-2006 2000;  2002-2005  2006  2000-2006 
Singapore  2000-2006 2000;  2002-2005  2006  2000-2006 
Thailand  2000-2006 2000;  2002-2005  2006  2000-2006 
Vietnam  NA 2000;  2002-2005  2006  2000-2006 
Sources: World Competitiveness Yearbook (column 1), World Governance Indicators (column 2), Global 
Competitiveness Report (columns 3-4). 
 
Table 4: Trade restrictiveness in ASEAN member countries. 
  Tariffs Only  Tariffs & NTBs  Tariffs & NTBs 
Ag. Only 
Tariffs & NTBs 
Mfg. Only 
  OTRI MA-OTRI OTRI MA-OTRI OTRI MA-OTRI OTRI MA-OTRI 
Brunei Darussalam  0.095 0.081  0.139 0.126  0.410 NA  0.097 0.126 
Indonesia  0.056  0.066 0.098  0.145 0.341  0.324 0.061  0.129 
Cambodia  NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA 
Laos  0.115  0.174 0.248  0.235 0.288  0.382 0.241  0.219 
Myanmar  NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA 
Malaysia  0.061  0.041 0.260  0.079 0.553  0.341 0.236  0.067 
Philippines  0.040  0.062 0.240  0.094 0.477  0.649 0.212  0.060 
Singapore  NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA 
Thailand  0.130  0.093 0.153  0.140 0.579  0.675 0.112  0.084 
Vietnam  0.160  0.157 0.368  0.238 0.541  0.535 0.349  0.170 
ASEAN  0.094  0.096 0.215  0.151 0.456  0.484 0.187  0.122 
World  0.107  0.099 0.181  0.166 0.357  0.422 0.156  0.110 
Source: Kee et al. (2006). 
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Variable Description  Year  Source 
comcolij  Dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j were colonized by the 
same power, else zero. 
NA Mayer  and 
Zignago (2006) 
comlang_offij  Dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j have a common 
official language, else zero. 
NA Mayer  and 
Zignago (2006) 
contigij  Dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j share a land border, 
else zero. 
NA Mayer  and 
Zignago (2006) 
lairijt  Simple average of air infrastructure quality in countries i and j. 
Converted to logarithms. Based on responses to the question: 
“Passenger air transport in your country is (1=infrequent, limited, 







ldistij  Great circle distance between the largest cities in countries i and j. 
Converted to logarithms. 
NA Mayer  and 
Zignago (2006) 
limportsijkt  Imports of country i from country j in sector k for year t. Converted 





lirregijt  Simple average of the extent of irregular payments in import/export 
transactions for countries i and j. Converted to logarithms. Based on 
responses to the question: “In your industry, how commonly would 
you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or 







lisp_compijt  Simple average of ISP sector competition index in countries i and j. 






lseaijt  Simple average of maritime infrastructure quality in countries i and 
j. Converted to logarithms. Based on responses to the question: “Port 
facilities and inland waterways are (1=underdeveloped, 7=as 






ltariffijkt  Simple average tariff effectively applied to imports of country i from 




smctry  Dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j were once part of the 
same country, else zero. 
NA Mayer  and 
Zignago (2006) 
 




Importers  Brunei, China*, Hong Kong China*, Indonesia*, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia*, 
Philippines*, Singapore*, Thailand*, Taiwan*, Vietnam*. 
Exporters  Brunei, China*, Hong Kong China*, Indonesia*, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia*, 
Philippines*, Singapore*, Thailand*, Taiwan*, Vietnam*. 
Note: * indicates countries included in the effective sample for the regression in the following Tables. 
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Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
-0.355*** -.359*** -.353***  ldist 
[0.118] [0.118]  [0.122] 
-1.266 -1.27 -1.33  ltariff 
[1.271] [1.27] [1.28] 
0.686   2.71**  lsea 
[1.244]   [1.29] 
4.873*** 5.56***   lair 
[1.421] [1.64]  
0.481 0.704  0.211  lirreg 
[0.673] [0.52] [0.706] 
1.186* 1.06* 2.23***  lisp_comp 
[0.603] [0.592]  [0.591] 
0.256* 0.251 0.243  contig 
[0.152] [0.151]  [0.16] 
0.345 0.319  0.313  comcol 
[0.209] [0.199]  [0.214] 
0.354** .351** .373**  comlang_off 
[0.151] [0.155]  [0.154] 
0.304 0.303  0.339  smctry 
[0.215] [0.216]  [0.226] 
1.578 1.37 4.85**  constant 
[2.271] [2.43] [1.89] 
Observations  1481 1481  1481 
F  62.49*** 63.40***  67.17*** 
R2  0.64 0.64  0.64 
Notes:  Estimation is by OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered by country pair, are in square brackets. 
  All models include fixed effects by exporter, importer, sector, and year. 
  20 outlying observations dropped from sample. 
Dependent variable is limports. 
  32Table 8: Gravity models estimated by BEC 1-digit sector. 
 Total  Trade  Food  Indust. 
Supplies 
Fuels Capital  Goods  Transport 
Equipment 
Consumer Goods 
-.281** -.482***  -.32*  -0.0376  -.57***  -0.154 -.384**  ldist 
[0.121]  [0.182] [0.166] [0.451] [0.151]  [0.293]  [0.165] 
-0.0317 -0.389  1.17 -8.5 -5.57  -4.42* -1.79  ltariff 
[1.65]  [2.07] [1.79] [7.05] [3.57]  [2.64]  [1.37] 
-0.136 -0.0991  -0.145  7.62*  0.111  -1.26 -1.27  lsea 
[0.997]  [1.73] [1.08] [4.01] [3.15]  [2.07]  [1.38] 
2.71** 0.803  3.89***  2.67  4.92**  7.12* 7.01***  lair 
[1.03]  [1.89] [1.11] [4.88] [2.03]  [3.63]  [1.89] 
0.721  0.221 .872* 0.222 -0.842  1.46  0.908  lirreg 
[0.593]  [0.983] [0.483] [2.2]  [1.55]  [1.15]  [0.637] 
1.26** 0.681  1.22***  4.51  0.932  0.411 1.14*  lisp_comp 
[0.607]  [1.21] [0.456]  [2.82] [0.666]  [1.63]  [0.67] 
.211*  -0.0832  .233* 0.782 -0.235  .651*  0.208  contig 
[0.113]  [0.221] [0.132] [0.579] [0.256]  [0.385]  [0.231] 
0.324  0.226 0.244 0.287 0.218  .862*  0.222  comcol 
[0.225]  [0.32]  [0.241] [0.924] [0.24]  [0.467]  [0.3] 
.339**  0.0523 0.0492 0.853  0.419  .559**  0.137  comlang 
[0.169]  [0.286] [0.164] [0.619] [0.271]  [0.258]  [0.202] 
0.00212  -.805***  0.465 1.33* -0.034  0.597  0.537  smctry 
[0.194] [0.27]  [0.318]  [0.766] [0.336]  [0.556]  [0.376] 
7.37*** 13***  4.86*  -19* 7.84*  -3.52  2.28  _cons 
[2.43]  [3.39] [2.6]  [10.2] [4.09]  [6.32]  [2.45] 
Obs.  211  251 251 228 251  249  251 
F  75.11***  26.73*** 82.55*** 11.89*** 62.24***  28.01***  31.41*** 
R2  0.92  0.79 0.93 0.65 0.89  0.7  0.85 
Notes:  Estimation is by OLS. Robust standard errors, clustered by country pair, are in square brackets. 
  All models include fixed effects by exporter, importer, and year. 
  Outlying observations dropped from sample. 
Dependent variable is limports by BEC 1-digit sector. 
 
Table 9: Simulation results, Scenario 1 (in million USD and percentage of baseline). 
Country Import  Gain  ($m)  Percent Export  Gain  ($m) Percent 
China  7296.0 10.2  8326.9 10.9 
Hong Kong, China  309.9 2.0  1129.0  7.0 
Indonesia  1522.1 17.5  4109.6 13.3 
Malaysia  1589.7 3.9  2149.7 3.0 
Philippines  2164.8 17.7  766.0  16.5 
Singapore  2371.7 3.8  1659.3 4.3 
Thailand  2305.6 6.8  1704.1 4.9 
Taiwan  2471.5 5.9  1083.3 6.0 
Vietnam  2372.8 20.6  1476.2 19.9 
Notes:  Trade impacts estimated using elasticities from Table7 column 1 applied to total trade (value). 
  Sample includes all listed countries, for the base year 2005. 
Simulation involves improving maritime port infrastructure in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam to the regional average (4.6). 
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Country Import  Gain  ($m)  Percent Export  Gain  ($m) Percent 
China  45911.3 64.5  51783.4 68.0 
Hong Kong, China  1106.1 7.2  7349.3 45.8 
Indonesia  7644.7 87.8  19265.5  62.4 
Malaysia  9667.4 23.9  13341.8  18.9 
Philippines  8801.7 71.9  2605.1 56.0 
Singapore  14283.8 23.2  10041.8 26.0 
Thailand  9542.2 28.1  7962.5 22.9 
Taiwan  14997.0 35.8  4720.9  26.2 
Vietnam  13005.3 113.0  7889.0  106.2 
Notes:  Trade impacts estimated using elasticities from Table7 column 1 applied to total trade (value). 
  Sample includes all listed countries, for the base year 2005.   
Simulation involves improving air transport infrastructure in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam to the regional average (5.1). 
 
Table 11: Simulation results, Scenario 3 (in million USD and percentage of baseline). 
Country Import  Gain  ($m)  Percent Export  Gain  ($m) Percent 
China  974.0 1.4  1291.1  1.7 
Hong Kong, China  192.0 1.2  211.3 1.3 
Indonesia  702.0 8.1  2374.7  7.7 
Malaysia  473.9 1.2  484.8 0.7 
Philippines  1171.8 9.6  454.5  9.8 
Singapore  805.6 1.3  465.4 1.2 
Thailand  565.9 1.7  0.0  0.0 
Taiwan  653.4 1.6  697.3 3.9 
Vietnam  1276.1 11.1  835.5  11.2 
Notes:  Trade impacts estimated using elasticities from Table7 column 1 applied to total trade (value). 
  Sample includes all listed countries, for the base year 2005.   
Simulation involves improving control of irregular payments in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to 
the regional average (4.6). 
 
Table 12: Simulation results, Scenario 4 (in million USD and percentage of baseline). 
Country Import  Gain  ($m)  Percent Export  Gain  ($m) Percent 
China  5819.3 8.2  6510.8 8.5 
Hong Kong, China  310.1 2.0  724.6 4.5 
Indonesia  668.4 7.7  1750.9  5.7 
Malaysia  1355.6 3.4  1761.9 2.5 
Philippines  182.1 1.5  45.0  1.0 
Singapore  2027.9 3.3  1494.1 3.9 
Thailand  1909.5 5.6  1757.2 5.1 
Taiwan  1551.6 3.7  919.9  5.1 
Vietnam  3197.4 27.8  2057.5 27.7 
Notes:  Trade impacts estimated using elasticities from Table7 column 1 applied to total trade (value). 
  Sample includes all listed countries, for the base year 2005.   
Simulation involves improving ISP sector competition in China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam to the 
regional average (4.9). 
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Table 13: Simulation results, Scenario 5 (in million USD and percentage of baseline). 
Country Import  Gain  ($m)  Percent Export  Gain  ($m) Percent 
China  2958.2 4.2  1802.3 2.4 
Hong Kong, China  0.0 0.0  604.3  3.8 
Indonesia  109.8 1.3  515.0 1.7 
Malaysia  1146.9 2.8  780.6  1.1 
Philippines  64.8 0.5  32.0 0.7 
Singapore  0.0 0.0  799.6  2.1 
Thailand  1061.0 3.1  823.2  2.4 
Taiwan  90.0 0.2  754.2  4.2 
Vietnam  864.8 7.5  184.2 2.5 
Notes:  Trade impacts estimated using elasticities from Table7 column 1 applied to total trade (value). 
  Sample includes all listed countries, for the base year 2005.   
Simulation involves reducing tariffs in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam to the regional average (5.6%). 
 
Table 14: Comparison of simulation results, Scenarios 1-5 (in million USD and percentage of baseline). 
 Trade  Gain  Percent 
Scenario 1  22404.1 7.5 
Scenario 2  124959.4 42.1 
Scenario 3  6814.7 2.3 
Scenario 4  17021.8 5.7 
Scenario 5  6295.3 2.1 
Notes:  Sample includes all listed countries, for the base year 2005. 





Figure 1: Estimated cost of importing, 2006. (Source: Doing Business.) 
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Figure 2: Estimated cost of exporting, 2006. (Source: Doing Business.) 
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Figure 3: Time to import, 2005-2006. (Source: Doing Business.) 
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Figure 4: Time to export, 2005-2006. (Source: Doing Business.) 
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Figure 5: Documents to import, 2005-2006. (Source: Doing Business.) 
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Figure 6: Documents to export, 2005-2006. (Source: Doing Business.) 
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  38Figure 7: Quality of port infrastructure, 2000-2006. (Source: Global Competitiveness Report.) 


















Figure 8: Quality of air transport infrastructure, 2000-2006. (Source: Global Competitiveness Report.) 



















  39Figure 9: Extent of irregular payments for export/import licenses, 2000-2006. (Source: Global 
Competitiveness Report.) 


















Figure 10: Quality of ISP competition, 2001-2006. (Source: Global Competitiveness Report.) 
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